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Logistics, Market Size and Giant Plants in the early 20










                   Around 1900, the businesses of developed Europe – transporting freight by a 
more advantageous mix of ships, trains and horses – encountered logistic barriers to trade 
lower than the tyranny of distance imposed on the sparsely populated United States. 
Highly urbanized, economically integrated and compact northwest Europe was a market 
space larger than, and - factoring in other determinants besides its (low) tariffs - not less 
open to inter-country trade than the contemporary American market was to interstate 
trade. By the early twentieth century, the First European Integration enabled mines and 
factories – in small, as well as large, countries – to match the size of United States plants, 
where factor endowments, consumer demand or scale economies required that. 
 
 





“We found there, as every attentive and expert traveller will find everywhere in the 
civilized world, some things better and some things less good than with us.” 
 
                            1906 German Official Report on US Visit (Hoff and Schwabach, North    
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                  The United States, by the middle of the twentieth century, had achieved an, 
historically unprecedented, economy-wide, productivity advantage. In 1950, its GDP per 
head was ahead of western Europe’s by around twice Britain’s lead over its continental 
competitors during the first industrial revolution.
1 The USA’s real GDP was then larger 
than the whole of western Europe’s, nearly three times the USSR’s, more than four times 
the UK’s and more than five times Germany’s. At that time the USA’s giant industrial 
corporations were even more dominant: they outnumbered those of the whole of Europe 
by two or three to one.
2 Some investigators of the sources of American industry’s 
productivity lead thus naturally linked it to the unparalleled opportunity to achieve scale 
economies offered by the United States’ exceptionally large domestic market.
3 
Subsequent historians have followed this lead. Alfred Chandler, for example, identified 
the smaller British market as one of the reasons why he believed its firms early in the 
century did not invest in large plants, distribution systems and managerial hierarchies on 
a sufficient scale, seeing the creation of a continent-wide market by the railroads as a 
major driver of what he thought was the exceptional development of giant American 
corporations.
4 “New economic geographers” also emphasize that trade costs, scale 
economies, imperfect competition and knowledge spillovers interact to give large 
countries a disproportionate share of world industry.
5 
                               The interactions among market size, firm size, and productivity are 
complex and change over time. The United States overtook the real GDP of the largest 
                                                 
1 Maddison, World Economy,  pp. 261-2. 
2 Hannah and Wada, Miezaru, p. 58. 
3 Though Rostas (Comparative Productivity, pp. 58-9) and Frankel (British and American Manufacturing 
Productivity, pp. 64-80) also cautioned that some small countries achieved high productivity and that the 
same may not hold for 1900. 
4 Chandler, Scale, p. 250. 
5 Krugman and Venables, “Globalization.”   4
European nation in the 1870s, but its manufacturing productivity may have forged ahead 
of Europe’s before it attained that scale advantage.
6 Moreover, market size is not simply 
determined by national boundaries: for many factories it will be smaller (a city or a 
region). It is affected not only by tariff levels (quite low in Europe before 1914), but also 
by transport costs and other factors, such as linguistic or monetary homogeneity or 
urbanization. Britain and Germany (together, before World War One, having the same 
real GDP as the USA) – along with France, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands - 
formed the largest compact urban market in the world and the massive trade flows of 
north-west Europe still accounted for most global manufacturing trade. This factor has 
been neglected by postwar historians, impressed by Europe’s 1950-1975 catch-up, that 
was driven partly by reversing the destruction of people and property and tariff 
escalations that had blighted its economic performance during its vile military conflicts, 
cold wars, partitions, nostrifications and dictatorships of 1914-1945. This article argues 
that the leading European producers typically had access to at least as wide a market as 
American firms earlier in the twentieth century and that they faced levels of cross-border 
market integration not dissimilar to today’s. There was simply no market scale reason 
why European plants around 1900 could not be as large as American ones; and, as it turns 





                                                 
6 Broadberry (“How did the United States”), though aggregation problems/quality differences may nullify 
some results.   5
                                               SHIPS, TRAINS AND HORSES 
 
                       The choice between the two main logistic options of the nineteenth century 
- ships and rail - depended partly on geography: there were no ships in Santa Fe and no 
trains to Hawaii. Yet, rail and water were substitutes on many long-haul routes, in global 
historical fact, as well as in Fogel’s counter-fact. As today, in tonne-kilometre terms, 
water transport dominated long-haul, though by the early twentieth century the balance 
varied, with rail being exceptionally important for the USA and Russia.
7 The data in 
Table 1 relate to transport use, not production: the latter would increase water’s share for 
the UK and Germany (large net exporters of shipping services) and lower it for Russia 
and the USA (the latter’s share of the world’s seagoing fleet had shrunk from 20% to 3% 
over a half-century, its imports and exports being carried overwhelmingly in foreign-
flagged ships; Russia also depended heavily on foreign ships).  
                    The reliability of the table falls off to the right: rail (and some domestic 
water) freight is reasonably hard data, the rest being crudely estimated from a coefficient 
relating the capacities of arriving and departing cargo-ships, voyage lengths and freight 
carried.
8 The precise quantities cannot be relied upon, though the orders of magnitude are 
broadly plausible. Islands or peninsulas - Britain, Italy, Japan – naturally used ships  
                                                 
7 Original data in Imperial, American or nautical measures have been converted to metric, with the French 
spelling of the metric tonne adopted to minimize confusion. 1 km=0.62 miles and one metric tonne (1,000 
kg)=1.10 short tons (2000 lbs) or 0.98 long tons (2,240 lbs), so a tonne-km is about two-thirds of a ton-mile. 
A nautical mile is 19% more than a “statute” mile, while a nautical ton’s weight (it being a volumetric 
measure - 40 cubic feet - of ship capacity) varies with load density.  
8 The assumption implicit in column 4 is that all seagoing steamships, whatever their flag, plying 
internationally from or to the named countries in the stated year had the same annual average voyage 
lengths and load factors as Hoffmann’s (itself heroic) estimate for all German-flagged steamships plying 
internationally in 1913. Pirath’s (Grundlagen, p. 79) estimate that 62% of world freight tonne-kms in 1930 
were by water is lower than the eight-country total in Table 1 (81%) and may be accounted for by   6
                                   Table 1. Freight Market Shares, ca. 1906. 
 
Country                        Rail                      Water Transport                   Total        Share  
and                     ( Domestic and    Inland.    Cabotage. International.  Freight        of                                       
Date                     International.)                                                           Market     Rail 
                                                                   
                                                           
                                                    (units: billion tonne-km) 
 
USA 1906                   320                69             60           264               713            45%   
 
“Europe”*                   177                49             72         1419             1718            10%   
 
of which:                       
 
   Russia 1913               76.4            28.9           20.3           74.0           199.6          38% 
          
   Germany 1906           48.3            12.5             1.5         181.6           243.9          20%        
 
   UK 1910                    22.1              1.1           33.5         585.7           642.4            3%   
       
   France 1906               18.2              5.1             1.9         247.5           272.7            7%  
 
   Belgium 1912              6.4              1.6             na            84.8             92.8            7% 
 
   Italy 1906                    5.2               na            15.1         245.8           266.1            2% 
 
Japan 1908                     3.0               na            25.0         244.9           270.2            1% 
  
 
* “Europe” is the rounded sum of the six European countries shown. 
 
Sources: Cols. 1-3: Barger, Transportation Industries, pp. 184, 254-6; Bureau, 
Transportation, p.33 (USA, with Barger’s 1889 water traffic distance coefficients, 
derived from interwar data, applied to the 1906 regional tonnages); Scherer, USSR, p. 231 
(Russia, post-1945 USSR borders, which approximate to those of the 1913 Tsarist 
Empire excluding Finland); Hoffmann, Wachstum, pp. 406-18 (Germany); Armstrong, 
“Role,” p176 (UK); Toutain, “Transports,” pp. 81, 158, 197 (France); Laffut, “Belgium,” 
pp. 217-218 (Belgium); Mitchell, International Historical Statistics, pp. 688 (Italy, with 
ratio of Italian cabotage derived from Schram Railways, p. 151 estimate for 1880/1); 
Minami, Railroads, p. 194 (Japan, with cabotage estimated by the author from indications 
in Ericson, Sound, pp.39-40, 397-8). Col. 4: Hoffmann’s estimates for the relationship 
between registered ship capacities, loads and voyage lengths are taken as the base to 
                                                                                                                                                 
intervening investment in rail, road and pipeline freight, higher representation of continental nations, or the 
Hoffmann coefficient being too high.   7
derive a coefficient, which is then applied to the national port data on the capacity of 
steamers entered and cleared with freight for the relevant year given in Anon, Statistical 
Abstract 1901/12, pp. 36-57 and Woytinsky, Welt, 5, p.77. International rail freight is 
apportioned in national statistics according to the distance traveled within each country; 
for international sea freight I have apportioned 50% of voyage distances to destination 
and departure countries. 
 
prolifically, as did a littorally-settled continent like Australia (not shown).
9 Yet 
America’s use of rail was massively higher even than the continental expanse of 
Germany; only Russia approached America’s rail-dependence. The USA and Europe 
overall made roughly similar use of inland waterways (the Great Lakes and the 
Mississippi were more than a match for the Rhine and the Volga) and cabotage (sea 
routes between domestic ports). What gave Europe its massive lead in water transport 
was international shipping and especially intercontinental voyages: Europe was - by 
construction - an equal partner in US-Europe trade, but its global engagement with Asia, 
Africa, Australasia and South America exceeded the USA’s. Despite many common land 
borders with extensive trade, most of European countries’ cross-border trade went by sea 
rather than rail.
10  Much of this sea-freight was intra-European, and in that sense, treating 
Europe as one economic area, functionally equivalent to US cabotage.
11  The Weltbűrger 
running a Hamburg shipping enterprise – though not averse to nationalistically-motivated 
supports that came from Imperial Potsdam – knew his profits fundamentally came from 
serving customers in St Petersburg, Copenhagen, Cherbourg, London and elsewhere. In 
like cosmopolitan spirit, the English mariners’ term “home trade” referred to voyages to 
                                                 
9 An indicator of mercantile marine capacity (which is not the same as their use of ship transport, 
irrespective of ownership, shown in Table 1) for a wider range of countries is the proportion of all transport 
motive power that was installed in ships (as opposed to locomotives), which ranged from 7% in 
Switzerland (1901) and 8% in the USA (1905), through 12% in Germany (1895), 14% in France (1896), 
15% in Belgium (1906), to 34% in Sweden (1896), 47% in the Netherlands (1904) and 88% in Norway 
(1905), see March, “Statistique Internationale,” pp. 10-12.  
10 Anon., Statistical Abstract 1902-3, pp. 262-265; Woytinsky, Welt, 5, p. 88. 
11 Oppel, “Seestädte,” pp. 198, 244.   8
and among nearby German, Dutch, Belgian and French ports between Hamburg and 
Brest. A large sample of crew agreements for 1863-1900 indicates that 43% of British                                     
steamer voyages were then within European waters, while a 1911 survey showed 21% of 
British shipping capacity operating within Europe.
12 By Hoffmann’s calculation, 43% of 
German shipping capacity in 1913 was plying to European destinations, though he 
reckoned these exclusively European voyages probably accounted for only 11% of sea-
freight tonne-km (oceangoing ships were larger, faster and spent most time at sea, while 
downtime in port, loading and unloading cargo, was the lot of short-haul captains).
13 Yet 
voyages he designates as intercontinental also served intra-European trade: fast liners 
plying from Hamburg to New York called at Cherbourg or Plymouth to pick up and set 
down small, high-value cargoes, as well as passengers; steamers from northern Europe 
that were Yokohama-bound docked at Mediterranean ports. The slightly more numerous 
foreign ships entering and leaving German ports (most European-flagged) were also 
likely mainly engaged in intra-European trade, but are excluded from Hoffmann’s 
calculations.
14 Europe’s “domestic” sea freight also had a higher value-to-volume ratio 
than the oceanic trades, perhaps reflecting the high share of manufactures and fuel 
carried.
15              
                      Ships had lower infrastructure costs (the sea was free) and also had the 
advantage of greater fuel-efficiency and lower terminal costs (cranes were ubiquitous in 
the main ports, and tramps carried their own lifting equipment for small ports, but 
manhandling – still widespread at all transport nodes - remained common in rail trans-
                                                 
12 Sager and Panting, Maritime Capital, pp. 205-6; Fayle, War, p.7. 
13 Hoffmann, Wachstum, pp. 412-13. 
14 See the voyage data in Danmarks Statistik, Statistisk Aarbog, pp. 79-83. 
15 Oppel, “Seestädte,” pp. 198, 244.   9
shipment).
16 Ships offered tonne-km freight rates only a half or a quarter of those of land 
transport, even, sometimes, as low as the one-seventh achieved by the modern 
development of supertankers and container shipping.
17 Yet trains could still compete if 
speed counted, though running at higher speeds was expensive in both modes. British 
freight trains averaged around 32 kmph and American ones around 17 kmph, though they 
could, if required, go faster (one source mentions 77kph); at sea, tramps and tankers 
managed 15-17 kmph and some coastal liners 25 kmph, but 44 kmph - the top speed of 
ships - was attained only by a few transatlantic liners.
18 Rail was also used if there was no 
access by water, or it offered more direct routing. Some routes - Galveston to Key West, 
Duluth to Cleveland, Stockholm to St Petersburg, Newcastle to Hamburg, Trieste to 
Brindisi, Antwerp to Bilbao and Barcelona to Genoa – were more direct (and often faster) 
by boat. Even circuitous routes, like Odessa to London (2,308 km as the crow flies, but 
6,326 km by steamer via the Bosporus, Mediterranean and Atlantic), were cheaper than 
the rail equivalent, especially for low-value traffic with low inventory costs. 
                    Marine geography, and a semi-depleted continent’s global quest for raw 
materials that America found abundantly in its virgin interior, no doubt partly explain 
Europe’s marked preference for ships, but relative prices also played a role: US rail 
                                                 
16 Pirath, Grundlagen, pp. 126, 209. An English collier could be unloaded in Hamburg in only 12-15 hours 
(Baedeker, Northern Germany, p. 164). The global investment in harbors, canals etc before 1914 was 
estimated (Woytinsky, Welt, 5, p. 19) at $14-19 billion and in ships at $6-7 billion, compared with the $55 
billion total investment in railways, though the latter accounted for fewer tonne-km. 
17 Toutain, “Transports,” pp. 166, 199; Armstrong, “Freight pricing policy,” and compare Limão and 
Venables, “Infrastructure,” p. 452.  
18 Fast passenger expresses by 1900 on rail routes like New York-Buffalo or Paris-Bayonne achieved 
average speeds of about 85kmph, while “ocean greyhounds” were crossing the Atlantic at 44 kmph (and 
both carried some freight), but specialist freight trains and ships went more slowly (and cheaply): see 
Anon., “Fast-train runs;” A. W Gattie, in Acworth and Paish, “British Railways,” p. 737; Historical 
Statistics, p. 4-929; Woytinsky, World Commerce, p. 435 and Armstrong, “Freight pricing policy,” p. 192.   10
freight rates were below the European norm, while US cabotage rates were not.
19 Among 
the possible reasons are factor costs, different freight mixes, speeds and journey lengths, 
railroad land grants, ownership/regulation/competition, higher European rail safety 
spending, the US ban on foreign crews and on foreign cabotage (compared with Europe’s, 
largely open, ports), and the failure to invest in Panama as speedily as Europe invested in 
ship canals.
20 Some of these possible determinants are compatible with marginal social 
costs differing less than observed market prices. Whatever the reasons, the upshot is 
clear: the American domestic market was glued together primarily by the train, but the 
First European Integration was driven by the ship. Europe’s long-haul costs per tonne-km 
were thus below what they would have been with a US ship-train mix. The European 
imperialists who argued for emulating the transcontinental railroads of the USA and 
Canada on what Europeans then thought of as their frontier – whether unifying the Tsar’s 
Empire with the Trans-Siberian railway or consolidating control of Africa with a Cape-
to-Cairo line - were deranged dreamers, not transport economists: ships were the efficient 
option for Vladivostock or Cape Town, as within Europe.
21 The future belonged 
substantially to sea-routes and already their advantage over land transport was clear.  
                 The major logistical bottleneck of 1900, in which there were also large 
international differences, was transport by road. At the turn of the century, this was, of 
                                                 
19 Barger, Transportation Industries, p. 184; Toutain, “Transports,”  pp. 278-9; Transvaal Chamber, 
Diagrams, exhibit 25; Pratt, American Railways, pp. 48-9; Ross, British Railways, pp. 182-4; Hoff and 
Schwabach, North American Railroads, pp. 269-320. Reported national average tonne-km freight rates 
vary because of different freight mixes, journey lengths, car-provision and trans-shipment services, but 
there was a consensus that, even allowing for such factors, US rail rates were cheapest for bulk long-haul. 
20 The only major European powers matching America’s ban on foreign cabotage were Russia and France, 
and protection appears to have weakened the merchant marine of all three. 
21Transvaal Chamber (Diagrams, exhibit 28) shows the high cost of African rail compared with sea. The 
Trans-Siberian was completed in 1905 and was unprofitable; the Cape-to-Cairo remains unbuilt. The 
purpose of the (shorter, and sometimes profitable) railways that were built in Africa (or Latin America) was, 
of course, as in the US interior, primarily supporting white settlers and farming/mining; though in India the 
railways mainly served indigenous demand.   11
course, principally by horse-drawn wagon or what in Asia was called the jinrikisha 
(literally “man-power-vehicle”), but, for most countries, such freights are a statistical 
desert. Road was unimportant in overall tonne-km terms because, given its cost, it was 
(before the motorized truck and improved intercity roads) sensibly avoided, where 
possible, for long-haul freight (and is therefore omitted from Table 1).
22 Yet, for the same 
reason, when there was no alternative and for short-haul trips and final delivery, it added 
massively to logistical costs. We might reasonably suppose, following the contemporary 
European stereotype encouraged by American cowboy showmen, that America was much 
more of a horse-riding and horse-drawn society than western Europe and (despite 
probable undercounting) the census data on teamsters and horses confirm this. In 1901, 
for example, there were perhaps 3.3 million horses in Britain, while the number in US 
cities alone equaled that and in the nation as a whole exceeded 24 million.
23 The huge 
extent of the American demand for road transport is also shown by the national 
production of carriages, wagons, carts and similar mobiles. In 1904 more than 1.7 million 
carriages and wagons, worth $97 millions at the factory gate, were produced in the USA: 
a level of unit sales per head of population not to be equaled by the new-fangled US 
automobile sector until the 1920s.
24  Around the turn of the century, the French were only 
producing 36,000 horse-drawn passenger vehicles annually, worth 35 million francs ($6.8 
millions) and it was reckoned that the total in service was only 1.5 million; the stock of 
                                                 
22 In France, for which contemporary survey data exist, road transport on principal roads would add only 
2.8B to the 25.2B tonne-km domestic total in Table 1. 
23 Thompson, “Nineteenth-Century Horse Sense,” p. 80; McShane and Tarr, “Centrality,” pp. 106-7. In 
Europe, only Russia came near to matching the US per capita horse population: of course, horses were 
extensively used for farm power and breeding for export, as well as domestic transport. 
24 Bureau, Manufactures, p. 840.   12
freight vehicles is not recorded.
25 Thompson suggests that in Britain there were perhaps 
702,000 freight carts, vans and wagons in service in 1901 and about the same number of 
passenger carriages, so the annual production of horse-drawn vehicles in the USA was of 
about the same magnitude as the total stock outstanding in Britain.
26 The UK output of all 
“carriages and carts for animal traction” in 1907 was around $6 millions, possibly, given 
higher British prices, little more than 20,000 units.
27 If that is right, the production of 
these road vehicles for all private, business, public hire and self-drive (passenger and 
freight) use was sixty times higher per capita in America than in Britain. Surprisingly, the 
American road vehicle manufacturing industry, despite the best efforts of Henry Ford and 
Alfred Sloan, was not able to maintain anything remotely like this early lead in the later 
age of the mass-produced automobile.
28 
                          The United States evidently entered the twentieth century as an 
exceptionally road-using society. Of course, much of the logistical need met by the 
teamster and his horses in America was performed by the denser European steam railway 
network.
29 In 1900 the USA’s rail system, at 311,287 km, was understandably a third 
longer than Europe’s west of Russia, but it served only 76 million people (compared with 
Europe-ex-Russia’s 285 million, in an area only half the size), so the services provided 
were less close to the median producer or consumer and less frequent (most was still 
single track). The mid-Atlantic region was the most densely networked and included four 
of America’s seven largest cities (New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh and Baltimore) as 
                                                 
25 Lavollée, “Carrosserie,” p. 756.  
26 Thompson, “Nineteenth-Century Horse Sense,” p. 72. 
27 Ibid., p. 61, n.3. 
28 In 1937, US automobile and truck unit output was only 3.5 times the per capita British level, compare 
Maxcy and Silberston, Motor Industry, p. 223 with Historical statistics, p. 4-831. 
29 Van Vleck (“Delivering coal”) is the revisionist account of small wagons and dense railways; Scott 
(“Path Dependence”) qualifies the revisionism; both arguably underplay dense rail’s advantage for general 
merchandise and the scale economies of coal transport by ship.   13
well as major operations of its largest corporations.
30 This region more closely resembled 
highly urbanized and industrialized north-west Europe and had a land area and track 
length only a little below the UK’s. Typically in such regions, on both sides of the 
Atlantic, lines were double-tracked (permitting around five times the traffic flow), though 
British railway managers were required to schedule higher-intensity traffic on their 
network: twice as many locomotives serviced a UK population one-and-a-half times 
larger than the mid-Atlantic region’s.
31 London, alone, had, in the early twentieth century, 
500 passenger rail stations (where parcels could be received or delivered: the railways 
competed with the Post Office and road hauliers for this business) and 74 goods depots 
(for heavier traffic like coal and timber, with 770 freight trains a day running among 
them).
32 Rail companies in Britain were among the largest importers and owners of 
horses, but only for the short collection and delivery runs necessary in such densely rail-
served cities. In Germany, too, the railways were more involved in the distribution of 
parcels and finished manufactures (and less in raw materials) than in the USA.
33 With 
this well-organized and competitive delivery network (doing work differently divided 
among express companies, manufacturers’ wagon fleets and self-drive farmers and 
storekeepers in the USA), European factories and warehouses could outsource 
distribution to tens of thousands of retailers more cheaply than their American 
counterparts (who were accordingly more likely to integrate forward to distribution).
34  
                                                 
30 The Interstate Commerce Commission definition of mid-Atlantic (Region II) is used here, incorporating 
much of Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland. 
31 Author’s calculations based on the sources for Table 1 and Interstate Commerce Commission, Statistics. 
32 A. W. Gattie in Acworth and Paish, “British Railways,” p. 738; Turnbull, Traffic, p. 139. The freight 
(parcels and mail) revenues of passenger trains in the UK added about 15% to freight train revenues around 
1910. 
33 Huebner, “Prussian Railway Rate-making,” p. 79; Woytinsky, Welt, 5, p. 89.. 
34 Pratt, American Railways, p. 275; Turnbull, Traffic, pp.123-148; Fox, Working Horses; Hoff and 
Schwabach, North American Railroads, pp. 351-3; Gomel, “Camionnage.” The US Post Office (unlike   14
                    Again, then, Europe probably had a logistical advantage. In France, horse on 
major roads cost 4.8 cents per tonne-km in the early twentieth century (against just over 1 
cent per tonne-km on French railways), while short-hauls on central London roads cost 
14.8 cents per tonne-km, though Van Vleck argues that the horse/rail fuel cost ratio - oats 
to coal - was more favorable in the USA.
35 Many Americans had less choice than 
Europeans: only one of hundreds of Belgian rural communes was further from a railhead 
than the 17km average for American cotton and wheat farmers. The rural rate by horse-
drawn wagon to railheads in 1905 was, according to the US Department of Agriculture, 
12.5 cents per tonne-km for wheat and 18.8 cents for cotton, against an average rail 
freight rate of 0.5 cents per tonne-km.
36  
 
                                     MARKETS WITH AND WITHOUT BORDERS. 
 
                           At critical points on the logistics spectrum, then, the United States was 
different: using trains where Europeans used ships, horses where Europeans used trains. 
Europeans thus had a scale economy advantage in transport: the horse-drawn wagon 
carried up to 4 tonnes, the railcar 8-50 tonnes and the ship upwards of a hundred tonnes 
                                                                                                                                                 
European equivalents) did not offer parcel service until 1913 and express companies (which had 300 
offices in New York City, some at stations, but most using wagons and ferries to connect to the railhead) 
usually had exclusive railroad agencies, with some pricing power. Manhattan stabled one horse for every 
6.5 humans in 1900, a higher figure than is plausible for London, compare Thompson, “Nineteenth-Century 
Horse Sense,” pp 70, 75, 80. 
35 Toutain, “Transports,” p. 278; Armstrong, “Freight pricing policy,” p. 183; Van Vleck, “Delivering 
coal,” pp. 151-3. The US price data suggest higher labor costs, however. 
36 Laffut, “Belgium,” p. 211; Andrews, “Freight Costs.” The US national accounts define the farm gate as 
the railhead, but, on Andrews’ data, some 7.2% of the recorded value of wheat shipped from the railhead 
was, in fact, the cost of horse transport, though this may exaggerate the opportunity cost of the time of 
farmers and farm horses.   15
to tens of thousands.
37 While we do not have satisfactory price and quantity data for all 
modes, it is clear that - allowing for greater European use of ships and greater American 
use of horses – their costs per tonne-km were closer together than unadjusted rail rate 
comparisons suggest and it is not inconceivable that average freight rates were similar for 
both continents.
38  
                            Critically, whatever their relative freight rates, Americans had to 
contend with the distances of a relatively empty continent, while European businesses 
benefited from the mutual proximity of dense settlement. The overall rate of urbanization 
in Europe west of Russia and the USA was similar, with 41-42% of people living in 
towns of more than 5,000 by 1910, but what was extraordinary about turn-of-the-century 
northwest Europe was the nine large conurbations of more than a half-million affluent 
consumers in a compact area (not to speak of 15 more cities of that size in the rest of 
Europe, against only seven in the whole USA). The average UK rail haul in 1910 was 
only 64 km, and in France 190km, against 402km in the USA, and this tyranny of 
distance is also reflected in the USA’s large requirement of (especially domestic) tonne-
km in Table 1.
39 The average distance between all nine north-west European 500,000+ 
population city pairs - London, Birmingham, Glasgow, the Lancashire and Yorkshire 
                                                 
37 In 1900, the capacity of a typical seagoing ship was 4,000 tonnes, a vessel on the Rhine 1,000 tonnes, a 
freight car 36 tonnes in the USA, 15 tonnes in Germany and 8 tonnes in the UK (Woytinsky, World 
Commerce, p. 308). 
38 Rail freight rates per tonne-km in 1905 in 11 continental European counties averaged nearly double US 
rates, see Webb, New Dictionary, p. 292, but compare note 19, above. The French data permit reliable 
calculation of the all-mode average. Combining the data in Table 1 with Toutain’s price data and road 
transport output estimates, gives an average French price of 2.4 centimes per tonne-km, compared with 5.4 
centimes for rail alone. If the outputs and prices of US horse and ship tonne-km netted to the same as its 
1906 rail rate of 0.5 cents (2.6 centimes) per tonne-km, US all-mode freight rates would have been higher. 
Broadberry’s (“How did the United States”) three-country comparison of transport productivity, because it 
omits horse and most shipping output, cannot provide a useful alternative guideline. 
39 Armstrong, “The role,” p. 176; Toutain, “Transports,” p. 158; Barger, Transportation Industries, p. 203. 
Rostas (Comparative productivity, pp. 83-7) was making essentially the same point when he suggested that, 
when corrected for longer distances, the apparent American 1930s productivity lead in transport 
disappeared.   16
conurbations, Amsterdam, Paris, the Ruhr conurbation and Hamburg - was around 500 
km and none of them were 1,000 km apart. The average distance between all seven 
American cities with that population (New York, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, 
Pittsburgh, St Louis and Baltimore) was 762 km and Boston to St Louis was 1,670 km; 
the European cities were also generally larger than the American. The United States was 
distinctively a land of small towns (and correspondingly fragmented markets).
40 Of the 
world’s dozen busiest transport nodes, seven – London, Liverpool, Cardiff, Newcastle, 
Antwerp, Rotterdam and Hamburg - were in northwest Europe, against only two – New 
York and Chicago - in the whole USA.
41 Europe’s trade was - with larger urban markets, 
shorter distances and a cheap transport mix – arguably less logistically constrained than 
in America. 
                     Other factors limited the First European Integration, most notoriously its 
patchwork quilt of customs barriers, particularly exacerbated by the Zollverein’s 1879 
tariff and the French Meline tariff of 1892, but these should not be exaggerated. In 1900 
British import duties amounted to only 4.6% of import values, German to only 8.1% and 
French to only 8.8%: all well below the prohibitive levels imposed in the USA (27.6%) 
and Russia (32.6%), levels generally avoided in western Europe before the 1930s.
42 In 
some industries like tinplate, British producers, locked out of the American market, were 
able successfully to shift their export focus to lower-tariff Germany and the 
Netherlands.
43 The contemporary protectionist drift was much more extreme in the USA 
                                                 
40 As is suggested by its proliferation of newspaper titles (whose circulation then often defined local 
markets): the 15,904 titles published in the USA in 1900 exceeded the figure for all Europe (Barwick and 
Eccles, “Newspapers,” p. 209). 
41 The others were Berlin, Suez and Hong Kong. All of these were served by both water and rail, but 
probably only in Chicago and Berlin did rail dominate the freight throughput. 
42 Broadberry, Productivity race, pp. 139-41; Capie, “Tariff Protection,” p. 21. 
43 Minchinton, British Tinplate Industry, pp.63, 80.   17
than in Europe, and all European countries exceeded the low US trade/GDP ratio that 
resulted from its extreme protectionism. British tariffs did not seriously inhibit trade: they 
were “revenue” tariffs, levied only on goods not produced in Britain or paralleled by 
excise duties on domestic products.
44 Low tariff policies, with only mild protectionist 
effect, were also followed by small European countries, notably Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland. With Britain, they collectively 
amounted to a “common market” not much smaller than the USA, with the added 
advantage of equally low import barriers against neighbors.
45 Transport costs for 
American mines and factories were often a higher proportion of cost and a more 
significant barrier to internal trade than such European tariffs.
46 
                   In higher tariff countries, many goods were on the free list (half the imports 
of France, Germany and Italy were duty-free), the major European countries all had 
extensive bilateral most-favored nation treaties and, where intermediate goods were not 
tariff-free, the effective protection rate for final production could be much lower than the 
nominal rate.
47 Despite a range of continental tariffs on sewing machines and parts that 
led to complex sourcing decisions, rather than simple exports of complete machines from 
the main Scottish factory, the market came close to being a single one by Marshall’s 
touchstone of the “law of one price:” European-manufactured Singers were available 
                                                 
44 Irwin, “Free Trade.” 
45 The familiar tariff-growth correlation need not invalidate this perspective, see Irwin, “Interpreting.” 
46 For a later period, see Finger and Yeats (“Effective Protection”). We cannot make precise statistical 
comparisons earlier, because input-output tables typically incorporate only rail transport costs, though these 
alone were 20% of US coal prices (Leontief, Structure, appendix table for 1919), while tariffs on coal were 
zero in much of Europe. James (“Structural Change,” p. 446, n. 17) notes the significant role of transport 
costs in reducing the minimum efficient scale in American industries. Jacks et al (“Trade Costs”) suggest 
that in 1913 the median country-pair total trade cost was equivalent to a 76% tariff, thus implying that tariff 
rates at typical European levels were not the most critical trade inhibitors; they also draw attention to 
proximity, culture, language, information flows and other factors endowing northwest Europe with the 
world’s lowest international trade costs, as indirectly measured by their gravity model. 
47 Woytinsky, World Commerce, p. 252; Liepmann, Tariff Levels, pp. 56-186.   18
Europe-wide at around $30 each (compared with the $50 - highly protected - American 
domestic price).
48 More than two-thirds of “world” trade in manufactures at the turn of 
the century was intra-European and there was a sense in which the Ruhr, Luxemburg, 
north-eastern France and Belgium were more closely inter-connected than any of them 
were to Berlin or Marseilles.
49 When we talk about globalization in the period before 
1914 we are talking of a process driven by the First European Integration: the intra-
continental and transoceanic trades of its western European heartland were both growing 
fast.  
                         International trade was relatively unimportant for Russia (imports plus 
exports of $10 per head in 1913) and the United States ($43), but a high proportion of 
incomes for Belgium ($207), Switzerland ($162), the UK ($134) and Denmark ($126), 
and not trivial for Germany ($73) and France ($70).
50 The British are sometimes accused 
of having focused on trade with Anglophones (the USA and the Empire), neglecting their 
European neighbors. The accusation is not without foundation, for language, culture and 
kinship did count in defining markets. US-UK trade exceeded that of any other country 
pair and an English tourist could reasonably expect to find his Lea & Perrins 
Worcestershire sauce in a Mississippi steamboat restaurant. It was cheaper, with the 
inauguration of the “Imperial Penny Post” in 1898, to send a letter from London to 
Vancouver (7,606 km) than from London to Paris (341 km) and, when the USA joined 
                                                 
48 Godley, “Global Diffusion,” p. 28. 
49 Maizels, Industrial Growth, p. 92. Luxemburg was in the German Zollgebiet, as was annexed Alsace-
Lorraine; Belgium and the Netherlands had low tariffs; so only (modest) German tariffs inhibited eastward 
trade and (modest) French tariffs westward trade within the core of what later became the heartland of the 
European Coal and Steel Community. 
50 Woytinsky, World Commerce, pp. 63-4.   19
the system (diplomatically re-branded the “Ocean Post”) in 1908, the whole English-
speaking world was united by one postal rate.  
                       Yet the UK was hardly constrained by such links. A country that added to 
its geographical advantage of island status the created advantage of free trade policies 
naturally won a quite disproportionate share of all world manufacturing exports: its 
businessmen, effectively, answered the inappropriate question “European or 
Anglophone?” with the sensible “both.” Within the European economic space, the best 
customer for exports from Germany, France, Scandinavia, Iberia and Greece in 1900 was 
the free-trading UK. Yet the top export customer of the UK itself – and of Switzerland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, Russia and Austria-Hungary - was mildly protectionist 
Germany, which consistently imported more manufactures than the UK.
51 In the decades 
before the First World War increasing US protectionism curtailed America’s import 
growth, but Germany’s rapid industrialization proceeded, more conventionally, on the 
basis of increasing the ratio of imports to national income. Europe accounted for more 
than three-quarters of “world” trade and most of that was intra-European.
52 Investment 
sometimes led or followed trade (and, then as now, much international trade was intra-
company trade). It is true that regions of recent settlement  exerted a powerful attraction 
for international investors - by 1914 $7.1 billion was invested in the USA alone - but 
Europeans also invested prolifically across their own borders: France had $5.3 billion 
                                                 
51Anon., Statistical Abstract, pp. 172-203; Liepmann, Tariff Levels, pp. 201-339; Maizels, Industrial 
growth, p. 436. 
52 In 1913, 40% of world trade was intra-European, 37% between Europe and elsewhere and only 23% 
between non-Europeans (Woytinsky, World Commerce, p. 71).   20
invested elsewhere in Europe, Germany $3.0 billion, Britain $1.1 billion and smaller 
countries perhaps a further $3.3 billion.
53 
                 Moreover, modern studies suggest that factors beyond tariffs and transport 
costs - including currency unions and cultural links – encourage trade.
54 Political union 
(the recent unifications of Germany, Greece and Italy apart) did not drive the First 
European Integration, but trans-European policy cooperation minimized potential 
disadvantages relative to the dollar area (itself a patchwork quilt of barely integrated 
banking regions, with less interstate banking than Europe). International agreements 
guaranteed unhindered passage on major waterways like the Sound, Bosporus, Suez, 
Rhine and Danube; while cross-border rail traffic was smoothed by the International Rail 
Traffic Association in Berne (also home to the International Telegraph Union and 
Universal Postal Union). German was the official language of several countries and 
widely spoken throughout northern and eastern Europe; French had a similar franchise, 
extending also to Rumania and Russia; while many merchants, given the importance of 
trade settlement by the bill on London and the ubiquity of British ships, understood 
commercial English. The educated elite were often trilingual: Queen Victoria could 
converse in either language with her grandson, Kaiser Wilhelm, or at her favorite 
vacation spot, the Promenade des Anglais in Nice. Passenger fares within Europe were 
generally lower than in the USA and even the more difficult, multi-mode journeys such 
as London to Berlin (via the Vlissingen ferry) could be completed slightly faster (under 
                                                 
53 Wilkins, History, pp. 147-50; Maddison, Monitoring, p.63. 
54 Jacks et al., “Trade Costs” is a pioneering attempt to measure these using a gravity trade model for 1870-
1913.   21
22 hours one-way) and at the same price ($20 first class) as the longer New York-
Chicago run. Passports were required for neither trip.
55 
                      Communication by telegram - then the favored medium for time-critical 
business communication - was as effective between countries as domestically and it was 
as cheap to cable London from Berlin as New York from Chicago.
56 In the smaller 
countries - Scandinavia, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland – nearly half the 
telegraph traffic was “international” (but overwhelmingly intra-European); even one-third 
of German cables were cross-border.
57 The Latin currency union meant that the Swiss, 
Belgian and French francs, Italian lira and other southern currencies were identical; there 
was also a Scandinavian currency union; while both unions and the two large 
independents, the mark and the pound sterling, had a fixed (gold standard) relationship, 
eliminating exchange rate uncertainty from most cross-border trade dealings. A German 
visitor did not consult a conversion table to work out the value of an English gold 
sovereign (20 shillings): she could see and feel it was the same weight and value as her 
Doppelkrone (20 marks). The First European Integration was, on some dimensions, more 
palpable than the postwar European Union. 
 




                                                 
55 Bradshaw, Through routes, p. 2; Baedeker, United States, p. 342. Only travelers to Rumania and Russia 
required passports within Europe. Passenger fares per km in 11 continental European countries in 1905 
averaged little more than half the American rate, see Webb, New Dictionary, p. 292. 
56 Lew and Cater, “Telegraph;” Baedeker, Northern Germany, p. xvi; World Almanac 1909, p. 283. 
57 Anon., Statistical Abstract1902/1903, pp. 270-77.   22
                                                   THE UPSHOT FOR TRADE 
 
                  If European markets were becoming more integrated before 1914, one would 
expect to find national specialization developing in some sectors.
58 This is most evident 
in mining, which had to be located where the deposits were, though some industrial 
processing often followed. In 1900 Russia produced 94% of Europe’s crude oil, 89% of 
its gold and 74% of its manganese, Italy mined 98% of its sulfur, Spain mined 68% of its 
copper ore and 58% of its mercury, Britain accounted for 55% of its hard coal production 
and Germany 42% of its zinc.
59 These high national market shares were largely a result of 
differing resource endowments (though also owe something to mining and metallurgical 
expertise and depletion in some regions, which could also change specializations). They 
are no more surprising than that much American copper came from Montana or much of 
its petroleum (in 1900) from Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Ohio. Natural resources 
were not, however, permitted to have a similar effect in agriculture, where - except in 
Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark - autarkic policies generally delayed 
trade-driven agricultural restructuring and forestalled efficiency gains on the scale 
America experienced. 
                   In manufacturing and services, natural resources and protection played a 
smaller part. Retail banks and insurance companies were, in order to serve their 
customers, necessarily spread throughout Europe, but the Bank of England, with an 
international as well as national role, was bigger than the Reichsbank, Banque de France 
                                                 
58 Paralleling similar developments among US states in 1860-1930, see Kim, “Expansion”. 
59 Statistique Générale, Annuaire Statistique 1938.In all cases percentages are of European (including 
Russian Azerbaijan in the case of petroleum) production, ignoring imports from outside Europe (but 
including Europe’s exports).   23
and Banque Royale (Belgium) combined.
60 Other wholesale, or specialist, financial and 
commercial services also centered on the UK. The assets of overseas banks with offices 
in London exceeded those of all British domestic banks and most foreign investment 
emanated from there; more securities were quoted there and more companies were 
formed there than in the whole of the rest of Europe; London insured most foreign (as 
well as British) ships and cargoes, though in the re-insurance industry (that is wholesale 
insurance) Germany took the lead.
61 National post offices monopolized domestic 
telegraphs, but the worldwide web of international cables was mainly in private sector 
hands: 57% of the European undersea cable network was run by London-headquartered 
companies.
62 It is more difficult to be precise about Britain’s share in the operations of 
international trading companies, partly because the sophisticated mix of financial, 
managerial, risk control, exploration, engineering, investment and logistic services they 
provided make defining the borders of the business impossible, partly because there were 
some powerful Dutch, French, Greek, Swiss, Swedish and German (not to speak of 
American and Japanese) competitors and partly because firms operating in the UK were 
so cosmopolitan as to defy any simple classification by national identity.
63 However, the 
main, separately identifiable tradable service - shipping – was clearly measurable and 
60% of Europe’s capacity in 1900 was in British-flagged ships. Much global shipping 
movement was directed via cable communication with the ports (and, increasingly, 
directly to ships by Marconi radio) by the polyglot owners and shipbrokers of the 
                                                 
60 Central banks were investor-owned utilities: my size estimates are based on stock market capitalizations.  
61 Hannah, “Pioneering;” Fayle, War, p. 6; Woytinsky, Welt, 5, pp 315, 331. 
62 Statistisches Jahrbuch 1909, pp. 36-7. 
63 Chapman, Merchant Enterprise; Jones, ed., The Multinational Traders.   24
(modestly-named, but actually global) Baltic Exchange in London.
64 The UK was the 
first country to derive most of its national income from the service sector, helped by 
European market integration driving this specialization in service exports.
65 
                 In basic industries, where German catch-up was clearer, access to cheap coal 
supplies remained critical for many processes. Coal-producing regions like the Ruhr, 
Silesia, Wales, Scotland and northern England had advantages in iron and steel 
manufacture, relative to Italy and France (which imported coal from Britain). The UK 
and Germany in 1900 jointly produced three-fifths of Europe’s iron and steel and both 
were large exporters, though Britain was cutting back (relatively speaking) in such basic 
intermediates.
66 In other European industries, the leading country market shares were 
already less evenly spread. The UK alone had 58% of Europe’s cotton spindles, while 
Italy produced as much as 84 % of Europe’s silk in 1900.
67 In some more technologically 
challenging industries, there were also clear divisions of European labor: around 1900 the 
UK produced 90% of Europe’s sewing machines, more than two-thirds of its ships and 
57% of its soda ash, Germany made perhaps 40% of its electrical equipment, half of its 
pianos (then vying with sewing machines and stoves as the leading consumer durable) 
and nearly all its dyestuffs, while France accounted for 79% of its automobiles.
68 Other 
                                                 
64 Board of Trade, Position, p. 252; Lew and Cater, “Telegraph, p. 151, 
65 Deane and Cole, British Economic Growth, p. 291; Lewis, Growth, p. 263. The USA did not match this 
until the 1950s (when its real GDP per head was more than twice Britain’s in 1900), suggesting that 
specialization through trade (rather than affluence) created the world’s first service economy. 
66 Annuaire Statistique 1938, p 337; Raffalovich, Le Marche Financier en 1901, p. 570. 
67 Picard, Bilan, pp. 323, 387; Federico, Economic history, p. 35. 
68 Pollard and Robertson, British shipbuilding industry, p. 249; Woytinsky, Welt, 4, pp. 222, 225, 311-26; 
Ungewitter, Chemie, p. 19; Ehrlich, Piano, p. 222; Laux, European Automobile Industry, p. 8.   25
manufactures - such as paper, sugar, cigarettes, stoves, agricultural machinery and 
locomotives - were more evenly spread around industrialized Europe.
69  
                    By these indicators, European economies appear more integrated during the 
First European Integration than today.
70 Following postwar integration, at the 2-digit 
manufacturing industry level, only Italian leather goods manufacturers (with 52% of the 
European industry’s output) have a degree of dominance similar to the higher levels in 
the prewar examples in (then very large) manufacturing industries like silk, cotton, or 
ships.
71 It is possible to interpret this as a sign that extensive specialization through trade 
was better developed in well-integrated European markets before 1914 than within the 
modern European Union, with non-tariff barriers and market interventions now inhibiting 
fuller integration. Yet such a conclusion is unsafe. More benign factors, like the spread of 
industrialization and catch-up in living standards, especially in Europe’s south and east, 
explain some of the contrast. There was parallel regional de-specialization in the United 
States from around 1930, caused by southern economic development, less resource-
intensive manufacturing production, new (and more mobile) energy resources and more 
reliance on created (and mobile) human capital. Such factors probably also account for 
much of the reduced modern manufacturing specialization among European countries 
                                                 
69 In some cases, these industries appear more regionally concentrated in the USA: for example, cigarettes 
in North Carolina, Virginia and New York, agricultural machinery in the Midwest.  
70 It might be objected that the examples given for 1900 are, in modern terms, at the 3-digit not 2-digit 
industry level, generating artificially higher specialization indexes. But modern 2-digit industries do not 
map easily onto 1900 data: ships or cotton textiles then accounted for such a high share of manufacturing 
employment (textiles alone accounted for more than a third in many countries) that a 1900 statistician 
devising categories of reasonably equal size would have made these separate 2-digit industries. 
71Europe-wide manufacturing industry data for 2000 show Germany as the largest European producer in 16 
of 22 2-digit industries, with its highest shares in automobiles (40% of total EU 25-country production) and 
electrical machinery (39%), though its average share in the other 14 industries was just below 25 %, with a 
range from 18% to 34%. Italy was the largest European producer in four of the remaining six industries, in 
one of which, leather, its share reached the exceptional level of 52% (its share of clothing was 35%, textiles 
30% and furniture and miscellaneous 22%). France dominated “other transport equipment” (that is, ships, 
aircraft and trains) but its share was only 30%, while the UK was the largest producer of office machinery 
and computers, with a 27% share (all figures calculated from sales data for 2000 on the Eurostat website).      26
relative to the higher level attained in the different regime of trade, technology and 
income distribution that obtained before 1914.
72 What is clear is that the factors identified 
here did make Europe – and particularly its highly developed northwest - a large, 
integrated trading and investment area. The European economic space is not – before 
1914 - sensibly treated as a series of isolated countries, fatally divided by protectionism 
and national identity. 
 
                                             GIANT INDUSTRIAL PLANTS 
 
                       If European firms likely had access to at least as wide a market as 
American ones at the turn of the century, then why did Europe not have plants and firms 
as large as the USA’s? The literature on why France or Britain failed to develop large 
plants and firms is extensive, though the same factors are often presumed not to apply to 
Germany: rapidly developing and with a population one-third greater than the UK or 
France.
73 However, these sharply differentiated national industrial landscapes, 
confidently identified by narrative historians, proved suspiciously invisible to the 
unimaginative bureaucrats who conducted national business censuses. Kinghorn and Nye 
have pointed out that the average employee numbers in early twentieth century 
manufacturing plants was much the same in Britain (64) as in the United States (67) and 
– though plants were generally smaller on the continent – they were actually larger in 
                                                 
72 On the US de-specialization, see Kim, “Expansion.”. 
73 Landes, Unbound Prometheus, p. 247; Kindleberger, Economic Growth, pp. 161-82; Elbaum and 
Lazonick, Decline, p. 2; Chandler, Scale, pp. 239-94, 397-502.    27
France (26) than in Germany (14).
74 Of course, much production everywhere remained in 
a long tail of handicraft trades and small factories, often with purely local markets, which 
generate such low averages. For our purpose, the focus needs to move to the larger plants 
that typically required a broader market for their output. Table 2 shows the location of 
most ‘giant’ manufacturing plants – those employing more than one thousand people - 
along with some data on ‘giant’ mines around 1907.  
                          There were perhaps 3,000 such giant manufacturing plants globally at 
this time, more than half in Europe, less than a fifth in the USA.
75 The choice of plants 
employing 1,000+ is not arbitrary: not only was it the touchstone of giant scale favored 
by contemporary statisticians (hence the availability of census data), but it clearly 
required a shift toward professional management. An owner-entrepreneur’s family might 
run a plant with 200 employees, or, with the help of a few senior clerks, even stretch that 
to 500, but supervising 1,000 people typically required the recruitment of more non-
family managers, with greater professional specialization of functions like payroll, book-
keeping, production and sales. 
                         The importance of distinguishing manufacturing from mining is evident 
from the table: studies which group them as “industry” (especially if they add in 
construction firms and utilities), and compare differently defined census results, are 
                                                 
74 Kinghorn and Nye, “Scale,” p. 97.  I use the terms plant and factory interchangeably, and to include also 
what the US census calls an establishment (including not only two factories under one ownership making 
the same product on the same site, but even non-contiguous, commonly-owned factories in the same city or 
county), a broader concept than European censuses. National censuses also treated integrated or diversified 
plants variously, sometimes dividing them into several component product plants. 
75 The 2,228 cases in the table exclude many countries. I have, for example, excluded seven small countries 
– Rumania, Greece, Norway, Denmark, Argentina, New Zealand and Australia - whose census data suggest 
from only one or two giant factories up to, at the outside, a dozen such plants totaling less than 25,000 
employees. In 1914, the average number of workers in India’s 271 textile mills was as high as 976 (The 
Indian Year Book 1918, p. 331), and, though information on their size distribution is unavailable, it is 
possible that most of these employed 1,000+, including salaried workers. Other omissions include China, 
Mexico, the Ottoman Empire and Spain.   28
 
 Table 2. ‘Giant’ factories and mines (1000+ employees) in the early 20th century. 
Country/Date.       Number of            Numbers employed.          Proportion of workforce 
                             giant plants.          Total     Average per               in ‘giants.’ 
                                                       in ‘giants’  giant plant. 
MANUFACTURING 
 
Brazil 1920                        29              46,057       1,588                     16.7% 
Russia 1907**                 302            623,888       2,066                     14.6% 
USA 1909                        550         1,155,345       2,101                    14.1% 
UK 1907*                          na            784,171         na                        12.4 % 
Canada 1922*                    na              45,857         na                          9.9% 
Sweden 1913**                22              30,982       1,408                       8.8% 
Germany 1907                 350            718,428       2,053                      8.6% 
France 1906                     162            296,625       1,831                      8.5% 
Austria 1902*                    na            235,262         na                         8.3% 
Hungary 1900                    29             49,346       1,702                       8.3% 
Japan 1907                       100            236,697      2,367                       7.4% 
Belgium 1910                    27              46,913       1,738                       6.7% 
Netherlands 1906*            na              36,019         na                           6.6% 
Italy 1911                         105         <214,095         na                        <5.8%*** 
Switzerland 1910*             na             25,089          na                          4.8% 
 “World” ca. 1907.         2,228§    <4,544,764       2,040                   <10.4% 
 
MINES. 
Transvaal 1898/9*             58              77,800      1,341                    77.8%   29
Japan 1907                         55            126,116      2,293                    70.9% 
Germany 1907                 236            660,424      2,798                    69.2% 
France 1906                       45            165,486      3,677                    62.4% 
USA 1909                        125            540,342      4,323                    48.7% 
Hungary 1900                    12              20,148      1,679                    35.7% 
UK 1907                          214            323,102      1,510                    30.4% 
Belgium 1910                    16              21,710      1,357                    12.8% 
“World” ca. 1907             761         1,935,128      2,543                    49.6% 
(Russia 1910                       31              84,872     2,735         partial listing) 
(China 1912                        10              49,760     4,976         partial listing) 
*estimated 
** including some mines, within an undifferentiated “metallurgy and mines” category. 
 
*** If the 105 Italian giant plants (exceptionally for smaller European countries) had 
matched the global average of 2,040 employees, they would have accounted for 5.8% of 
Italian manufacturing employment in 1911. 
 
§ estimated on the basis that the average employment in the giant plants of countries 
without data is a weighted average (2,040 employees) of those for which data exists 
(1,676 plants). 
 
Sources: USA: Bureau, Manufactures, p. 185, Mines and Quarries, p. 35; Lebergott, 
Manpower, pp. 514, 516. UK: Home Office, List of Mines, List of Quarries and see note 
93. Germany: Kaiserlichen Statistischen Amte, “Gewerbliche Betriebstatistik,” pp. 4-13, 
58-153 (excluding construction, gas and laundries). Netherlands: Van Gerwen and 
Seegers, “De industrialisatie,” p.156. France: Statistique Générale, Annuaire 1909, p. 188. 
Austria, Italy, Canada: Woytinsky, Welt, 4, pp. 42-5, 49. Belgium: Ministère, 
Recensement. Russia: Rashin, Formirovanie, pp. 42, 96; Peacock, Russian Year Book, pp. 
185-7. Sweden: Statistiska Centralbyrån, Statistisk Arsbok, p. 106. Switzerland: 
Statistischen Bureau, Statistisches Jahrbuch, p. 114. Hungary: Ungarischen Statistischen 
Zentralamt, Volkzählung, pp. 203*-205*, 259-62. Brazil: Ludwig, Brazil, p. 287. Japan: 
Bureau, General Information, pp. 10-29 (mines); Ministère des Finances, Annuaire, pp. 
74-5 (with further tobacco factory breakdown from Anon., Tabako Senbaishi, pp. 622-4; 
Anon., Kojo Tsuran. Transvaal: Chamber, Tenth Annual Report, pp. 55, 452 and see n.75.   30
China: Woodhead and Bell, China Year Book, pp. 62-73 (multi-shaft companies counted 
as one mine); and see notes 77-9, for major adjustments made. 
 
 
misleading. The mining industry (mainly, at this time, coal mines) was, indisputably, 
characterized by large workplace units: perhaps half the world’s miners worked in giant 
mines, but only one in ten manufacturing workers were in similar-scale factories.
76 (In 
this table, US mines were the largest and Britain’s and Belgium’s the smallest, though, 
since this resulted more from differential geology than from managerial choice, it is 
perhaps of limited interest).
77 It is also important, for countries (like the USA) which 
excluded very small producers from their census, to add back the un-enumerated workers 
to the denominator of the last column, for comparison with countries that conducted a full 
census. Where census tables do not include government plants (common in mining, 
munitions, shipbuilding, explosives, railway equipment, tobacco and printing), 
consolidated totals are required.
78 Finally, some censuses enumerated only blue-collar 
workers, so an adjustment is required for comparison with those including administrative, 
                                                 
76 For Transvaal the data relates to its (dominant) gold mines only, though there were also coal mines there. 
Mine size was estimated on the basis that any company reported as recently recruiting 700 or more from 
the Rand Native Labour Association employed 1,000+ and that that distribution is representative of total 
mine employment averaging 100,000 in 1898/9. The data on individual mines in the Rand Mines group and 
averages for other groups (Transvaal Chamber, Diagrams, especially exhibits 20 and 23) support these 
assumptions and suggest that employment below 1,000 was common only in mines not yet producing; the 
average in the table is based on the 58 producing mines only, from exhibit 13. 
77 Church, History. Some countries not shown had smaller mines: in New Zealand, for example, all 150 
coal mines operating in 1911 employed fewer than 1,000 (Fraser, New Zealand Official Year Book, p. 632). 
That mine size is geology- rather then culture-driven is suggested by the role reversal in gold, with small 
US mines (low-tech, near-surface nuggets) and massive British-owned Transvaal mines (the Rand’s 
geology requiring very deep shafts and capital-intensive surface ore processing). 
78 Government plants were more concentrated than private ones (24% of German, 59% of French and 79% 
of Japanese state manufacturing employees were in giant plants) and accounted for 9% of German, 15% of 
French and 53% of Japanese workers in giant factories shown in column 2. The US census reports 40 
government manufacturing establishments (printing works, armories etc) employing 32,519 wage-earners, 
but gives no size breakdown. I have arbitrarily assumed ten of these employed 1,000+, with the same 
average employment as private giant plants, or 21,020 in total (and, for the purposes of Table 3, that three 
of these employed 9,000 in shipbuilding, from among the 12 US government shipyards recorded as 
employing 14,540 wage-earners).    31
technical and clerical workers (typically, at this time, 5-10% of employees).
79 I have 
attempted to standardize the data in all these ways. The figures marked with a single 
asterisk are estimated from size classes other than 1,000+ and even the latter may use 
inconsistent definitions of plants, so modest national differences should not be accorded 
any significance.
80 
                     Factories employing 1,000+ had probably overtaken the number of giant 
mines globally in the late nineteenth century. In Germany, there had been only 40 giant 
factories in the private sector in 1882 (half the then number of giant mines), but this rose 
to 144 in 1895 and 315 by 1907, with the proportion of all manufacturing employees in 
these giant plants rising from 2.4 % to 8.1% over the same period. In French 
manufacturing the number of giant plants rose from 108 in 1896 to 162 in 1906, in 
Hungary from 11 in 1890 to 29 in 1900, in Belgium from 8 in 1880 to 27 in 1910, in the 
USA from 443 in 1899 to 648 by 1914 and in Russia from 243 in 1901 to 372 in 1914. 
Given these rates of increase, the US census timing (1909) possibly exaggerates its plant 
sizes, relative to the four largest European countries (reported for 1906-7).  
                            85% of the giant US plants were in the industrial northeast (178 in the 
mid-Atlantic states, 159 in New England, 115 in the east north central states) and more 
than half were in six census categories: cotton goods (77), steelworks and rolling mills 
(57), construction and repair shops owned by steam railroads (44), foundry and machine 
                                                 
79 I assumed that giant Belgian, Canadian, Japanese and US plants had the same proportion of salaried 
employees as their average plant, or, in the absence of such data, that 7.5% of employees were salaried. No 
allowance was made for salaried employees increasing the number of plants above the 1,000-employee 
threshold, so there remains an underestimation (columns 1, 2 and 4) or overestimation (column 3).  
80 Based on average plant sizes within the known ranges, relative to the known French size distribution, the 
proportion in 1,000+ plants was estimated as 45% of employees in 500+ plants for Switzerland, 50% of 
those in 500+ plants for Canada and 28% of those in 200+ plants for the Netherlands. For Austria, the 
estimate is based on the Hungarian proportion of those in 20+ plants.   32
shops (41), woolen textiles (24) and slaughtering and meatpacking (23).
81 European 
census categories differ somewhat, but the industrial distribution of giant plants appears 
broadly similar, meatpacking apart (Europeans killed their locally-reared meat in small 
slaughterhouses or, for the chilled product, had their Australian and Argentine cousins do 
the mass destruction job for them). In Germany, the industries with most large plants - 
also accounting for more than half the total - are otherwise similar: machinery and 
equipment (77 plants), rail and other vehicle-building (39), textile weaving (34), iron and 
steel (31), and textile spinning (28).
82 At least in relatively mature industries with some 
evolutionary track record, the determinants of optimal scale – whether technological, 
managerial or market access – appear to be operating world-wide. 
                          It may seem surprising that most of these factories (and most giant 
mines) were investments in basic technologies developed before 1850, or, in the case of 
major breakthroughs in an old product, steel, in 1850-70. Yet to contemporaries these 
were the aspirational targets, whether for a Russian, Japanese or Italian (contemplating 
industrialization as an escape from poverty) or for an American (now rivaling Old World 
living standards, not just with advantageous land endowments, but because US 
manufacturers rivaled theirs). Indeed, in steel and some advanced machine-making, giant 
                                                 
81 Bureau, Manufactures, pp. 207, 235. 
82 Kaiserlichen Statistischen Amte, “Gewerbliche Betriebstatistik,” pp. 2-13. The first category – machinery 
and equipment - is unhelpfully broad, including locomotives, steam engines, boilers and elevators, as well 
as all kinds of agricultural, textile, sewing, building, printing, brewing, distilling and miscellaneous 
machinery, many separately itemized in the US census. The French census categories are also broader and 
less easy to compare, but a similar pattern is evident in the first three of the four largest categories of 
textiles (40 plants), metallurgy (17), metalworking (17) and state factories (14). (This is 1901 French data; 
1906 to be substituted when data located). In Britain, we can only compare large firms (employing 3,000+), 
but the distribution is not dissimilar: the largest categories are machines and equipment (23), textiles (17), 
ships (16), iron and steel (13), food (11, though these are branded goods manufacturers, not 
slaughterhouses) and railway workshops (8). Britain was more regionally specialized: for example, the 
world’s largest city - London - had almost no giant manufacturing plants (Bowley, “Survival,” p. 114 
shows 1 industrial plant employing 1,000+ and 2 employing 500-999), while there were dozens of giant 
plants in (less financially and commercially specialized) Berlin and New York.   33
plants required more know-how, skilled workers and/or capital than countries like Japan, 
Russia or Italy could muster. These countries were only developing them experimentally 
or modestly – often with foreign technicians, investors and managers - at the close of the 
nineteenth century.  
                       Really “modern” industries of the second industrial revolution, though 
growing rapidly in relatively advanced economies, still had few giant plants, in some 
cases no more than several dozen worldwide. However, as can be seen from their 
(bracketed) workforce shares in Table 3, in these industries giant units were more 
dominant, a trend that was particularly strong in shipbuilding and electrical 
manufacturing. National variations were also more apparent here: there were 20 giant 
German chemical plants, 19 in shipbuilding and 15 in electrical, but, in the USA (an 
economy twice Germany’s size), only 7 in chemicals and 11 each in shipbuilding and 
electrical. Contrariwise, in the, then most widespread, branded packaged product, 
Germany had only 3 giant tobacco factories, but there were as many as 13 in the USA. In 
the most recent innovation - automobiles - America also led, with 15 plants employing 
1,000+, against Germany’s one. In 1906/7 aggregate European car production still just 
exceeded that of the USA, but the industry prospered outside Germany: there were 
several large automobile plants in the UK, Italy and Belgium, but France - conventionally 
specializing in hand-crafted, luxury items (which, of course, is what most cars then were) 
- had the most.
83 
                           The nearest comparable British data, which are for the largest firms in  
 
 
                                                 
83 Laux, European Automobile Industry, pp. 8, 28, 36-41; Shaw, “Large Employers;” Ministère, 
Recensement, p. 213; Laux, In First Gear, pp.185-6, 212, 216.   34
Table 3. Employment in ‘Giant’ Plants (1,000+ employees, Germany, USA) or Firms 
(3,000+ employees, UK) in ‘Modern’ Manufactures, ca. 1907. 
Country/date             Chemicals       Electrical        Ships         Tobacco   Automobiles 
                                                    Number of employees in ‘giants.’ 
                                   (and their share in each industry’s total employment). 
Germany (1907)          42,159             62,684         65,332          4,962           1,165 
                                    (23%)               (39%)         (75%)            (3%)          (12%) 
USA (1909)                15,413              50,481        28,151         22,286         27,715 
                                     (7%)                (48%)         (54%)           (11%)         (32%) 
UK (1907)                  26,400              25,242      104,805          15,500          3,200 
                                    (20%)               (40%)         (49%)           (41%)          (11%) 
 
                                                  (Labor productivity: USA=100) 
Germany                             na                na                54                    98               44 
UK                                       66               na              131                  166               23 
Source: Employment: as Table 2 (with US wage-earners adjusted upwards for salaried 
employees by industry-specific ratios; and British employment figures for multi-industry 
firms apportioned equally between industries). Labor productivity: Broadberry, 
Productivity Race, pp.164, 178 (chemicals - mean of oilseed, soap and fertilizers – and 
automobiles, 1907/9); Lorenz, “Evolutionary explanation,” p. 915 (shipbuilding, 1900); 
Hannah, “Whig Fable,” p. 59 (tobacco, 1912) 
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these industries - those employing 3,000+, of which the UK had 6 in electrical, 5 in  
chemicals, 2 in tobacco, 1 in automobiles and 16 in ships - are also shown in Table 3.
84 If 
these figures are a reasonable proxy for the numbers employed in large plants in these 
industries (as they probably are), then the conventional notions of early twentieth century 
UK “backwardness” in large-scale production of electrical equipment, German 
“backwardness” in automobiles and tobacco and American “backwardness” in ships are 
confirmed. These rankings would not change on an output basis, if the crude comparative 
productivity data – shown in the lower half of the table – are an appropriate guide.
85 
                         Of course, all of these “modern” industries contain some “old” elements: 
branded cigars and plug, not “modern” cigarette factories, account for most American 
tobacco employees.
86 The most expensive and sophisticated contemporary capital goods 
were warships and liners costing $5 million each: their turbine rooms alone were the size 
of a central power station and transatlantic liners were so large they could only dock in 
New York and half a dozen European ports. Yet small coasters and lighters cost no more 
than the $100,000 for a freight train: both were, in essence, low-tech iron tubs with steam 
engines attached. If we considered only shipyards building state-of-the-art liners, the 
USA would disappear from the table (Cramp’s Philadelphia yard dropped out of 
contention when these ships became faster and larger after 1895), while Germany would 
                                                 
84 Shaw, “Large Employers;” Wardley, “Emergence.” Many of these employees were in plants employing 
less than 1,000, but many others would be employed in plants of 1,000-3,000 owned by firms employing 
less than 3,000; the reliability of the estimation depends on these two effects cancelling each other out. 
Applying the same method to Germany (for large German firms employing 3,000+, see Wardley, 
“Emergence”) would result in an underestimation of German employment in large plants in chemicals, 
automobiles and tobacco and an overestimation in electricals and ships. 
85 Not something that can be taken for granted, see, for example, Leunig, “A British Industrial Success.” 
86 Hannah, “Whig Fable,” pp. 51, 62.   36
gain share: the top end of this market was confined to one French, three UK and three 
German shipyards.
87  
                        Table 3 suggests stronger British commitment to large-scale in chemicals 
than the USA. Yet we know the United States’ chemical workforce at the dates shown 
(228,362) was larger than either Germany’s (184,482) or Britain’s (127,700).
88 However, 
this industry encompassed a variety of products with different optimal plant sizes and 
countries had focused their development variously: Germany on dyestuffs (where BASF 
employed 8,877, Bayer 7,811, and Hoechst 6,000 in 1907, in each case primarily at one 
central plant), Britain on alkalis and explosives (where two large firms with one dominant 
site employed 8,000 and 4,000), and the United States on fertilizers (in which the 1909 
census records the largest plant employing only 419 wage-earners) and patent medicines 
and drugs (in which America’s largest chemical plant - probably Parke Davis of Detroit - 
employed 1,789,  but the next four only around 600 each).
89 America simply had many, 
modestly-sized, chemical factories in laundry blue, soap, blacking, polishes, grease, 
tallow, turpentine, fertilizers,  patent medicines and drugs, so less than 7% of its chemical 
employment was in giant plants (making this one of America’s least concentrated 
industries), compared with 20% in Britain and 23% in Germany (among their modestly 
concentrated sectors). Mixing water, alcohol, opium and advertising (the main 
                                                 
87 Rieger, Technology; Murken, Die grossen transatlantischen Linienreederei-Verbände, pp. 738-41. In the 
other high-tech sector, warships, the relative strengths were similar, though the US maintained capability 
there. 
88 author’s calculations. I have excluded from the US “chemical and allied products” classification 
manufactured gas, petroleum refining, baking powder, yeast and salt, to align it with European census 
definitions. 
89 The US also had 4 giant alkali and general chemical plants, the largest employing 1,473, 1 giant soap 
plant employing 1,102 and 1 giant explosives plant, employing 1,579. The German census split up the 
Leverkusen and Ludwigshafen complexes into smaller plants, producing intermediates and dyes. The 
peculiarity of the US chemical industry has been missed by narrative historians, but was picked up by 
James (“Structural Change,” p. 447, n.20), who noted that in 1890, exceptionally, it showed decreasing 
returns to scale at its average plant size.   37
ingredients of contemporary patent medicines), though very profitable, simply required 
smaller, less capital-intensive plants than synthesizing dyestuffs or producing Solvay 
soda and dynamite. 
                       National variations in investment in large plants in modern industries may, 
but do not necessarily, imply grave social or entrepreneurial failure. At the technological 
frontier, it may make perfectly good sense for advanced nations to specialize, according 
to local factor endowments or demand conditions (or, indeed, randomly) in pioneering 
breakthrough technologies; or luck may have dealt differentially favorable opening hands. 
These industries were at an earlier evolutionary stage than the (more evenly spread) large 
plants in textiles, steel and simpler engineering, so emulation may not yet have had time 
to work (as is suggested by the, quite pervasive, catch-up by initial laggards in the next 
decades).
90 However, there were sometimes internal or external economies of scale or 
learning effects which gave first movers an advantage that locked followers out in export 
markets as well as at home (as is suggested by the US and UK clawing back markets only 
by postwar expropriation of German dyestuffs patents and massively protective tariffs). 
Alternatively (or as well), market demand may have varied, even in apparently similar 
countries (at one level, it is not difficult to explain why Americans operated relatively 
few ships, and low British investment in electric tramways and lighting has been 
similarly excused). 
                           The French and German censuses also enumerate size classes above the 
1000-employee mark: showing that, in France 5 manufacturing plants employed 5,000+, 
and as many as 10 mines (these were the large mines of the Nord and Pas de Calais 
                                                 
90 Germany’s share in world chemical production, for example, fell after 1897 (Ungewitter, Chemie, p. 26); 
Britain’s share in shipbuilding was also to decline after 1914.   38
immortalized in Zola’s Germinal); while in Germany there were 12 factories and 32 
mines employing 5,000+ in the private sector alone.
91 There were probably also about a 
dozen US factories, and several dozen US mines, of that super-giant size.
92 We also know 
that there were at least 20 British factories (but not a single mine) above the 5,000-
employee threshold, though some were multi-product sites that would have been counted 
as several plants in the continental censuses. Indeed, Krupp’s Essen works – with 33,917 
employees by 1909 - may well have been the world’s largest, private, multi-product, 
manufacturing complex by employment size, though it was actually enumerated as 
several smaller plants in the census.
93 The table shows the danger of extrapolating from 
that icon of Prussian militarism, for beyond Essen lay a diverse economy of medium-
                                                 
91 The German census did not enumerate separately the 5,000+ category for the 35 public-owned 
manufacturing plants and 16 publicly owned mines employing 1,000+.  
92 The 1899 US census (p. lxxiiv), exceptionally, singled out an Ohio iron and steel mill employing 7,477 
(perhaps a Federal Steel plant), a New Hampshire textile mill employing 7,268 (presumably Amoskeag in 
Manchester), an Illinois agricultural machinery maker employing 6,728 (presumably McCormick or Moline 
Plow) and a Pennsylvania electrical manufacturer employing 6,318 (presumably Westinghouse’s Pittsburgh 
works). In the 1909 census, it is not possible to deduce whether the single Pennsylvania electrical plant 
which then had 7,083 wage-earners (presumably again Westinghouse in Pittsburgh) was bigger than any of 
the two in Massachusetts employing a total of 9,867 wage-earners or the two in New York employing a 
total of 12,654 (presumably these include General Electric and Western Electric plants, and logically at 
least one must have employed 5,000+). The steel mills are even more aggregated, making it impossible to 
distinguish the largest plant in Pennsylvania, Ohio and Illinois, though we know from another source that 
US Steel’s Carnegie (Homestead) plant employed 6,000 around 1905 (Hoff and Schwabach, North 
American Railroads, p. 25). Similar aggregation problems apply to textiles, though one New Hampshire 
woolen mill employed 5,000. The 1909 census also lists an Illinois rail car manufacturer employing 5,002 
(presumably Pullman), a New Jersey sewing machine manufacturer employing 7,444 (presumably Singer), 
a New York men’s clothing manufacturer employing 5,560, a Virginia shipyard (presumably Newport 
News) employing 5,065, a Pennsylvania coke plant employing 5,214 (presumably US Steel/Frick), and a 
Wisconsin steam railroad construction and repair shop employing 5,466. This means that 9 US factories 
can be positively identified as employing 5,000+. It is likely that there were a few more concealed in the 
aggregations and also dozens of mines in that size category, given that the 125 largest US mines employed 
an average of 4,323 (Table 2) 
93 Krupp, Statistische Angaben, p. 11. The German census of 1907 registers one large steelworks in Essen 
employing 9,945 and a smaller range of giant plants in arms, machinery etc. The equivalent English 
armaments firm, Armstrong-Whitworth, employed “over 12,000” at Elswick, one of its 4 plants, in 1906, 
and several other British plants were around that size (Shaw, “The large manufacturing employers,” p. 47). 
The French census identifies the five largest plants with 5,000+ employees as being in chemicals 
(presumably Saint-Gobain), iron and steel (presumably Schneider’s Le Creusot plant) and the state sector 
(presumably three tobacco or explosives factories). The largest Japanese plant was probably the Yokosuka 
Naval Arsenal, with 28,920 workers in 1907. There were similarly-sized Russian state armaments 
operations: the Gau artillery factories employed 33,000 in 1908, see Gatrell, “Defence Industries,” pp. 136-
7.   39
scale plants producing beer, cigars, children’s toys, pianos, porcelain, sausages and 
silverware.
94 The proportion of Germany’s manufacturing workforce in giant plants was, 
in fact, below the global average.  
                      Yet Britain and Germany together have substantially more workers in giant 
factories (whether that is defined as 1,000+ or 5,000+) than the USA (which had a real 
GDP equal to both combined), and this is consistent with the notion that their 
manufacturers were not constrained by smaller national market size.
95 Germany 
employed slightly more workers in manufacturing than the USA and a greater proportion 
of American manufacturing employees were in giant plants, while Britain’s 
manufacturing workforce was only three-quarters their size, so the proportion of UK 
employees in giant plants was closer to the American level. Germany’s surprisingly 
modest rank in the last column of Table 2 may be more a reflection of the continuing 
viability of small-scale craft production in a lower-wage economy, than of what was 
                                                 
94 Cassis (Big Business) and Wardley (“Emergence”) cogently argue similarly in relation to firm size, using 
a variety of measures. 
95 UK production censuses did not report plant sizes before 1930, but Shaw (“Large manufacturing 
employers”) and Wardley (“Emergence”) identify over 100 UK firms employing more than 3,000 people in 
1907. This gives a direct estimate (for 30 single-plant firms only) for some giant plant sizes and these giant 
UK plants were larger than matched pairs which can be identified in the US census (see, for some examples, 
notes 92 and 93 above). However, Nye and Kinghorn (“Scale”) show the average size of plants in all size 
ranges was slightly lower in the UK in 1901 (64 employees) than in the US in 1904 (67), suggesting these 
plants may not be representative. Conservatively, an estimate of 13.2% of the British workforce employed 
in giant plants (0.9 of a percentage point below the American proportion) was used as a first approximation. 
UK figures for total manufacturing employment vary among the censuses of population and production and 
the Home Office returns, but the definitions used by other countries would give a figure for 1907 of around 
6.3 million, suggesting 831,915 employees in UK manufacturing plants in the 1,000+ size range. An 
alternative estimate can be derived from assuming that the ratio employed in firms employing 3,000+ and 
in plants employing 1,000+ is a constant (compare n.84, above). Wardley’s and Shaw’s data on large 
employers in 1907 show the UK employed 882,882 (14.0% of its manufacturing workforce) and Germany 
830,418 (10.3 % of its manufacturing workforce) in 3,000+ firms, suggesting, by extrapolation from the 
German ratio of employment in 1,000+ plants, that 736,427 were employed in such plants in the UK. The 
different assumptions behind these alternative estimates may not be warranted (this is the least satisfactory 
estimation in the table), but the resulting range - 11.7-13.2% of total manufacturing employment (and its 
mean, shown in the table) – indicates the likely order of magnitude.   40
happening in its modern factory sector.
96 Indeed, the data in Table 3 imply the proportion 
of all manufacturing employees in giant plants in “modern” industries was not higher in 
the United States (1.8%) than in Germany (2.1%). 
                         Brazil and Russia top the last column of Table 2 and even Soviet-era 
economic geographers acknowledged that “(Tsarist) Russia was superior to the advanced 
capitalist countries in the concentration of industrial production.”
97  The lack of any 
correlation of large plants and development levels in the table counsels caution in using 
terms like “superior” (or “modern” or “efficient”) in this context. The leaders may simply 
be rapidly developing regions with cheap land - like these and the mid-west US 
industrializing states – where larger plants could be built on “greenfield” sites than on 
crowded west European (or Japanese, or American eastern seaboard) urban sites. At this 
date, the modal giant plant was still the classic Victorian factory: a multi-storey “cube” 
optimizing steam power distribution and requiring only a modest footprint for 1,000 
workers, though already some factories were much larger. 75 miles from St Petersburg, at 
Narva, the water-powered, vertically integrated Krenholm cotton mill was “considered by 
many to be the best-managed mill in the world” and was certainly the largest.
98 Built and 
owned by the Knoop family of Bremen and Manchester (exclusive agents in Russia for 
                                                 
96 The last column of Table 2 is sensitive to the definition of total manufacturing employment. This 
boundary was less clear in an era of craft production than in a later age of standard industrial classifications, 
and choices by census authorities or reporting firms matter (for example, are steam laundries, repair 
workshops or small bakeries - or the teamsters/waiters/nurses employed by factories - included in 
“manufacturing”?) In poor countries, like Russia and Japan, most manufacturing workers were still 
homeworkers, craftsmen or in small workshops, not employed in powered factories: so, in Japan, for 
example, the proportion of factory workers accounted for by the giant plants was as high as 18.9%, more 
than twice the level reported in the table. 
97 Lavrishchev, Economic Geography, p. 93. 
98 Wallace, Times, p. 69 and see also Thompstone, “Ludwig Knoop;” Milward and Saul, Development, p. 
405. My great-great-grandfather was one of the Lancashire cotton expatriates of St Petersburg, where my 
great-grandmother was born. Although the original factory was destroyed by military action, a successor, 
British-owned, Krenholm textile enterprise again exists in independent Estonia.   41
the leading textile machinery manufacturer, Platt Brothers), its thirty British expatriate 
managers supervised a $19 million investment and 12,000 workers, operating 472,500 
spindles (5% of Russian cotton spinning capacity) and 3,672 looms. Extensive assembly 
sites were also increasingly required by large system integrators of heavy equipment like 
locomotives, power stations and ships. Sites with larger, single-storey, footprints were 
also beginning to be developed for electric-powered, flow-production assembly in lighter 
industries. 
                       The reason for ambiguous impressions of France is readily appreciated 
from Table 2. It is true that Germany employed around three times as many in large 
plants and mines as did France, but those who seek the reasons in an irrational French 
preference for small scale are barking up the wrong tree: the balance of French choices, 
shown in the last column, is insignificantly different from the revealed plant size 
preferences of German businessmen. The reason that France had fewer large factories 
and mines was that a smaller proportion of the smaller French workforce was employed 
in manufacturing and mining.
99  
                      That national borders may have constrained plant size in smaller European 
countries is consistent with their clustering at the bottom of the table, though the numbers 
are small (and within the margins of census definitional variations and estimation errors). 
Moreover small US states, like California and Florida, were even more bereft of giant 
plants.
100 The exceptions should also be noted: Belgium and Sweden - with real GDPs 
                                                 
99 In 1906/1911, in France 26% of 22 million active workers were in mining and manufacturing, a similar 
proportion to the USA (25% of 37 million), but the proportions were much higher in heavily industrialized 
Germany (36% of 27 million) and the UK (45% of 18 million), see Bairoch, Deldycke and others, La 
Population active, pp. 53, 83, 96, 98. 
100 The USA showed greater regional concentration of giant plants than is apparent within Europe in Table 
2, with highs of 27 % of New England’s manufacturing workers in giants, 16% in mid-Atlantic and 15% in 
east north central, down to only 5% in east south central and 3% in the Pacific region (Bureau,   42
only 7% and 4% of the USA’s - had respectable proportions of giants.
101 Belgium could 
not vie with the big powers in the size or number of heavy armaments and chemical 
factories or shipyards, but it had multiple giant plants in steel, glass, railway equipment 
and textiles and single giants in electricals, small arms, zinc and automobiles. On the 
other hand, Switzerland (with a real GDP only 3% of the USA’s) and even Italy (with 
19%) register low portions of manufacturing employees in giants. If the difference is 
significant, this underlines both the key sources of European market integration and the 
residual barriers. Belgium had Antwerp – a seaport that vied with Hamburg to be 
continental Europe’s largest - and several low-tariff, high-income countries were but a 
short sea voyage away; Sweden had similar port access; while Switzerland was 
landlocked, as well as unluckily bordered by four countries with the highest tariffs in 
western Europe. Italy’s abundant sea lanes mainly facilitated access to itself and other 
poor Mediterranean countries and its 1880s trade war with a promising potential partner, 
France, had been misjudged. Europe certainly had some internal trade problems that the 
US constitution (and the later EU market rules) outlawed, but they could be overcome.                         
                       Plant employment size is the only yardstick for which extensive 
internationally comparable data is available in this period, but the output of plants in low 
productivity countries, like Japan and Russia, will be exaggerated by these statistics, 
relative to countries with higher productivity and more energy-intensive and capital-
intensive plants.
102 Yet in some modern plants even Russia and Japan achieved 
                                                                                                                                                 
Manufactures, p. 235, uncorrected for US census truncation, which would lower the percentages slightly). 
However, no US region was as large as the UK or Germany and their most industrialized regions, the 
Rhineland and northwest England, may have exhibited ratios approaching New England’s. 
101 The pre-1919 Hapsburg Empire (including Austria-Hungary) was, of course, neither small nor land-
locked. 
102 There is no standardized capital stock data for continental Europe and Goldsmith’s (Comparative 
national balance sheets, p. 40) raw data suggest, somewhat implausibly, that Germany was substantially   43
productivity levels approaching the USA’s, so any blanket correction based on national 
aggregate productivity differentials is potentially misleading.
103 It is possible that, 
because more handicraft production could survive in low-wage Germany, its giant plants 
had higher labor productivity relative to its manufacturing average than in a high-wage 
country like the USA. If so, their figures in the last column, calculated on plant outputs 
rather than employment, would, despite lower German productivity overall, be closer 
together.
104 We simply do not know. What we do know is that by 1912 giant 
manufacturing and mining firms in Europe – measured by the market value of their equity 
(thus focusing on capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive firms) - were slightly less 
numerous and smaller than those in the United States (except in Britain, where they were 
still slightly larger).
105 If the USA had any scale advantage, it was in firm rather than 
plant size, and that lead appears to have been shared by Britain and to be of relatively 
recent origin in both countries.
106                               
 
                                                                                                                                                 
more capital-intensive than the UK and USA. There is also a massive – and unresolved - disagreement 
about the relative capital-intensity of UK and US production in the nineteenth century between Field 
(“Land abundance”) and Maddison (“Standardised estimates”). An approximation of energy-intensity is the 
amount of installed steam power (the main power source in transport and industry) per head of population. 
In 1896 this was 0.35 hp in the UK, 0.25 in the USA, 0.18 in Belgium, 0.16 in Germany, 0.15 in France, 
0.12 in the Netherlands, 0.05 in Italy and 0.03 in Russia (author’s calculations from data in Woytinsky, 
Welt, 4, p. 59), though there was no doubt some convergence in the following decade or so.
  James 
(“Structural Change,” p. 442) notes that concentrated US industries had experienced more labor-saving 
technical change. 
103 Crisp,“Labour,” p. 397; Hannah, “Whig Fable,” p. 59-61. For widely varying productivity differentials, 
even in advanced countries, see Table 3. On the other hand the tens of thousands employed in integrated 
armaments factories in Japan and Russia (and the more modest totals in similar British and American plants, 
see note 93, above) probably reflect their lower productivity, not higher output. 
104 Output data by plant size is generally not available for European manufacturing in this period. 
105 Hannah, “Marshall’s Trees,” pp. 263, 277-81. He, arguably, understates giant firms in Europe and Japan 
because of the omission of some state firms and treating as domestic some South African, Mexican or 
Russian firms that were, in fact, financed and run by west European capitalists and managers from London 
or Paris. 
106 An unpublished study by the author shows Britain having almost the same number of giant industrial 
firms in 1900 as the USA, though Germany then headquartered significantly fewer. Kim (“Rise”) 
emphasizes the marketing, rather than plant-level, economies revealed in the post-1919 US data.    44
                                                
                                                         CONCLUSION 
 
                     The statistical picture painted here, of the world after the turn of the century, 
is merely a snapshot – with a generous exposure time covering a decade or so of available 
data points - of a dynamic situation. The later twentieth century was to see momentous 
developments in the mining and manufacturing sectors – and in logistics - as well as both 
violent and peaceful dismemberment of the cosmopolitan market of the First European 
Integration. The race to higher living standards in the next half century was to be 
decisively won by the United States. On its pathway to economic supremacy, America 
developed larger plants - and a much larger domestic market - than its European 
competitors. It did so without the advantages over Europe at the outset with which it has 
been credited. We should not confuse the chicken with the egg, even if we have a well-
founded suspicion that the two are critically and serially inter-related. There was also a 
good deal more to the twentieth century future than the large-scale production on which 
narrative historians have focused. The impression of larger American markets and plants 
around 1900 in some literature is more a symptom of Whig hindsight in diagnosing, 
largely imagined, root causes of later divergence than an accurate portrayal of turn-of-
the-century reality and of the range of potential developments contained within that world. 
If we are properly to evaluate the contribution to the economic outcomes, for their 
nations at mid-century, of what Americans did right, or what Europeans did wrong, we 
should first recognize accurately the varied, but more-or-less level, playing fields on   45
which the New and Old Worlds – or at least their respective north-eastern and north-
western segments – started their twentieth century.     
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